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Restoring the Character Evidence 
Rule: Reconsidering Evidence of 
Crimes, Wrongs, and Other Acts in 
Rhode Island 
Edward Pare III* 
INTRODUCTION 
The American criminal justice system rests on the 
fundamental notion that criminal actions, not criminal character, 
warrant criminal punishment.1  American courts are not to render 
verdicts based on whether an individual is a bad person or 
whether an individual has a propensity for criminal behavior.2  
Rather, the system convicts on proof of the crime alleged.3  Yet, 
this bedrock principle has been remolded and chiseled down in 
recent years to the point that this once well-settled exclusion now 
serves as more of an exception rather than the rule.4 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2016. 
 1.  See Michelson v. United States, 355 U.S. 469, 475 (1948) (“Courts . . . 
almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any 
kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil character to establish a probability of 
his guilt.”).  
 2.  See, e.g., People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930) 
(explaining that this principle underlies criminal justice through the general 
policy of excluding evidence of prior wrongs because, if “propensity may be 
proved against a defendant as one of the tokens of his guilt, a rule of criminal 
evidence, long believed to be of fundamental importance for the protection of 
the innocent must be first declared away”). 
 3.  See United States v. Cohen, 544 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[O]ur 
system of criminal justice focuses solely on the commission of specific 
forbidden acts, rather than the punishment of those persons who have a 
criminal or evil character.”).  
 4.  See Paul S. Milich, The Degrading Character Rule in American 
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In Huddleston v. United States, the United States Supreme 
Court chiseled away at that fundamental bedrock by remolding 
the character evidence rule.5  In Huddleston, the Court adopted 
an inclusionary approach to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 
holding that evidence of prior wrongs is admissible under the rule 
if offered for a permitted purpose, provided that the evidence 
passes a Rule 403 balancing test.6  Furthermore, the Court held 
that, when proof of the prior wrong is offered for a permissible 
purpose, a trial judge need only find that the jury “could 
reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”7  The Court reasoned that the procedural protections 
that lie within the Federal Rules of Evidence were sufficient to 
protect a defendant from undue prejudice.8 
However, since Huddleston, states have remained free to 
implement their own standards of admissibility for evidence of 
crimes, wrongs, and other acts.9  Each state, in accordance with 
its own rules of evidence, has the independent authority to craft a 
substantive standard of admissibility on top of the procedural 
 
Criminal Trials, 47 GA. L. REV. 775, 776–77 (2013); 1B CIPES, BERNSTEIN & 
HALL, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 26A.01[3]-15 (Matthew Bender, rev. 
ed., 2012).   
 5.  485 U.S. 681 (1988).   
 6.  Id. at 687–88.  Such permitted purposes include, but are not strictly 
limited to, “proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”  FED. R. EVID. 
404(b)(2). 
 7.  Id. at 690.  A trial court itself need not find that the government has 
proved the conditional fact, but only that the jury could reasonably make 
such a finding.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 691–92.  For example, the Court concluded, based on a review 
of Rule 404(b)’s legislative history, that a trial court will subject prior wrongs 
evidence to a Rule 403 balancing test to determine “whether the danger of 
undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence.”  Id. at 688 
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note).  But, the Court 
acknowledged Congress’s intention that the balancing test should be 
conducted with an eye towards admissibility.  See id. at 688–89.  The Court 
found that Congress was more concerned with “ensuring that restrictions 
would not be placed on the admission of [Rule 404(b)] evidence” than with the 
potential prejudice to the defendant.  Id.  
 9.  See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 541 So. 2d 801, 814 (La. 1989) (holding that 
evidence of other bad acts must be “clear and convincing” to gain 
admissibility); Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154, 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) 
(en banc) (rejecting the Huddleston preponderance standard of admissibility 
and holding that “the proper quantum of proof in establishing that the 
defendant committed the extraneous offense is beyond a reasonable doubt.”).   
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safeguards that already exist within its own rules of evidence.10  
Rhode Island is no exception.11  Yet, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court fully adopted the Huddleston approach to evidence of 
crimes, wrongs, and other acts in State v. Rodriguez.12  In doing 
so, the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted a new approach to 
its once-exclusionary rule regarding such evidence.13 
This Comment will argue that the procedural protections 
endorsed in Huddleston are not adequate to safeguard against 
improper admission of evidence of prior wrongs.  As we reconsider 
the way courts handle crime and punishment, it is also time to 
reconsider the fundamental promise of Rule 404(b)’s original 
exclusionary approach to evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, and 
other acts.  While the potential for undue prejudice is certainly an 
important interest served by Rule 404(b), the greater, more 
practical concern lies with the potential erosion of a defendant’s 
presumption of innocence.14  As such, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court should reconsider its adoption of Huddleston’s inclusionary 
approach to Rule 404(b) evidence, and instead require “clear and 
convincing” proof of evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts as 
a prerequisite to admissibility. 
Part I explains how the United States Supreme Court came to 
adopt the Huddleston standard, exploring arguments offered from 
the United States and the defendant.  This Comment will also 
explore how the procedural protections the Court endorsed in 
Huddleston are inadequate when compared to the consequences of 
admitting evidence of prior bad acts.  Part II explains the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court’s adoption of the Huddleston approach to 
Rhode Island’s Rule 404(b) and how its adoption strays from the 
promises and purposes that once formed the underpinning of the 
rule excluding character evidence.  In Part III, by framing the 
discussion around the context of current discourse regarding the 
criminal justice system, this Comment will examine the 
 
 10.  See FED. R. EVID. 1101(a) (describing the binding applicability of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to federal courts).   
 11.  See State v. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145, 151 n.9 (R.I. 2010) (noting that 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court is “not bound by the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of its rules of evidence.”).   
 12.  See id. at 151–52.   
 13.  See id. at 154 (Robinson, J., concurring).   
 14.  See Milich, supra at note 4, at 797–99.   
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unintended consequences associated with remolding Rule 404(b) 
as an inclusionary rule.  Finally, this Comment concludes by 
offering a clear, bright-line solution: Rhode Island should adopt a 
“clear and convincing” standard of admissibility for 404(b) 
evidence. 
I. THE HUDDLESTON STANDARD 
In 1985, Guy Huddleston was convicted of selling and 
possessing stolen videocassette tapes in interstate commerce.15  
Mr. Huddleston’s conviction not only left him imprisoned, but it 
also left a lasting legacy for the interpretation of the admissibility 
of crimes, wrongs, or other acts.16  The singular focus of Mr. 
Huddleston’s trial was whether he knew the tapes were stolen; if 
so, he was certainly guilty of possessing and selling them in 
interstate commerce.17  In order to show that Mr. Huddleston had 
the requisite knowledge, the government made a motion in limine 
to introduce evidence of Mr. Huddleston’s similar bad acts under 
Rule 404(b).18  The district court admitted evidence of two specific 
prior bad acts: First, the testimony of Mr. Paul Toney, a record 
store owner, to whom Mr. Huddleston had allegedly offered to sell 
stolen television sets; and, second, testimony from “an undercover 
FBI agent posing as a buyer for an appliance store” to whom Mr. 
Huddleston had offered to sell “hot” goods.19 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit initially reversed, suppressing 
Mr. Toney’s testimony about Mr. Huddleston’s offer to sell him 
stolen televisions.20  The Sixth Circuit held that the prosecution 
 
 15.  Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 682 (1988).   
 16.  See Edward J. Imwinkelried, “Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire”: 
Should the Judge or the Jury Decide the Question of Whether the Accused 
Committed an Alleged Uncharged Crime Proffered Under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404?, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 813, 816–17 (1998). 
 17.  Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 683.   
 18.  United States v. Huddleston, 802 F.2d 874, 875 (6th Cir. 1986), rev’d 
on reh’g, 811 F.2d 974 (1987).   
 19.  Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 683.  Specifically, an agent for the FBI 
testified that Mr. Huddleston offered to sell him 10,000 VHS tapes, indicating 
that some of the tapes were “hot.”  Brief for the United States, Huddleston, 
485 U.S. 681 (No. 87-6), 1988 WL 1031752 at *6.  Mr. Huddleston testified in 
rebuttal that he had told the agent that all of the items he offered to sell 
“were not hot.”  Brief for Petitioner, Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681 (No. 87-6), 
1987 WL 881126 at *10. 
 20.  See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 684. 
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failed to present “clear and convincing evidence that the television 
sets [at issue] were stolen.”21  However, upon rehearing, the Sixth 
Circuit issued a per curiam opinion affirming the district court’s 
admission of Mr. Toney’s testimony, and held that the 
government’s burden to introduce the similar acts was by a 
preponderance of the evidence.22  This split within the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals over the standard of admissibility for 
evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts mirrored a similar split 
among the other circuit courts of appeals.23  The Supreme Court of 
the United States granted certiorari to hear Mr. Huddleston’s 
appeal to resolve whether Rule 404(b) requires clear and 
convincing proof of other bad acts, or whether proof that such bad 
acts occurred requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.24 
In this landmark decision, the Court held that while the text 
of Rule 404(b)’s contains no explicit standard of admissibility for 
evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts, the admission of such 
evidence hinges on conditional relevance.25  As such, the standard 
 
 21.  See id.  
 22.  See id.  The Sixth Circuit explained:  
[I]n light of the recent decision of another panel of this court in 
United States v. Ebens  . . .we now conclude that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard does not govern the admissibility of 
“similar acts” evidence sought to be admitted under [Rule] 404(b).  
Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard adopted in 
Ebens, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in 
admitting evidence of the similar acts in question here. 
United States v. Huddleston, 811 F.2d 974, 975 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) 
(citations omitted).   
 23.  See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686 n.2.  The Court summarized the 
split amongst the circuits:  
The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits allow the admission 
of similar act evidence if the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to 
find that the defendant committed the act.  Consistent with the 
Sixth Circuit, the Second Circuit prohibits the introduction of similar 
act evidence unless the trial court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant committed the act.  The Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits require the 
Government to prove to the court by clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant committed the similar act. 
Id. (citations omitted).   
 24.  See id. at 685 (citing Huddleston v. United States, 484 U.S. 894 
(1987)).  
 25.  See id. at 689.  This discrete procedural decision is the primary cause 
of the erosion of Rule 404(b)’s promise to preserve each defendant’s 
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of admissibility requires only that a jury could reasonably find 
that the other act occurred by a preponderance of evidence.26  The 
Court reasoned that procedural mechanisms built into the Federal 
Rules of Evidence were sufficient to safeguard against the 
introduction of “unduly prejudicial evidence,” and laid out the 
procedural protections within the Rules as follows: 
[T]he protection against such unfair prejudice emanates 
not from a requirement of a preliminary finding by the 
trial court, but rather from four other sources: first, from 
the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be 
offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy 
requirement of Rule 402—as enforced through Rule 
104(b); third, from the assessment the trial court must 
make under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative 
value of the similar acts evidence is substantially 
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and 
fourth, from Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which 
provides that the trial court shall, upon request, instruct 
the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered 
only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted.27 
This decision was fatal to Mr. Huddleston’s appeal for relief, and 
precluded a heightened, clear and convincing standard of 
admissibility for evidence introduced under Rule 404(b).28 
As for Mr. Huddleston’s particular situation, the Court 
affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, holding that because a jury 
could have reasonably found that the televisions were stolen when 
Mr. Huddleston possessed and sold them, the evidence was 
properly admitted.29  On a much larger scale, this decision 
resolved a circuit split in holding that the standard for admitting 
evidence of a defendant’s prior bad act is merely a trial court’s 
determination that a reasonable jury could find that the a prior 
bad act occurred by a mere preponderance of the evidence.30  
 
presumption of innocence before a jury.  See infra Parts II & III.   
 26.  See id. at 689–90.   
 27.  Id. at 691–92 (citations omitted).   
 28.  See id.  
 29.  Id. at 692.   
 30.  Id. at 690.   
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II. RHODE ISLAND’S RULE 404(B) 
A. Crafting a Rule for Evidence of Crimes, Wrongs, and Other 
Acts 
Before 1987, Rhode Island law was generally opposed to the 
use of specific instances of an accused’s prior bad acts in criminal 
cases.31  As the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted in 1896, 
“[p]articular acts or instances of misconduct cannot be proved; nor 
rumors and reports. . .”32  Thus began the inquiry: when is 
evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts admissible, and exactly 
how much proof is needed to show that the act occurred? 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court squarely addressed the 
issue of when evidence of an individual’s prior wrongs is 
admissible in State v. Colangelo.33  In Colangelo, the Court upheld 
the admission of the defendant’s prior immoral sexual conduct, 
which the government had used to support the defendant’s 
conviction for being a “common cheat.”34  The defendant had been 
proselytizing, referring to himself as the “Nazarene Christ,” and 
used this identity to solicit money by invoking his powers to cure 
illness, preach, and sell various knickknacks.35  At trial, the 
government presented evidence that the defendant had primarily 
directed his efforts toward women, whom he had conned into 
“giv[ing] him either gratuitous service or [supplying] him with 
 
 31.  See Heather E. Marsden, Note, State v. Hopkins: The Stripping of 
Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b) Protections from Accused Sexual 
Offenders, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 333, 333 n.4 (1998) (“Before Rhode 
Island enacted evidentiary Rule 404(b), the Rhode Island Supreme Court had 
followed a similar common-law rule.”) (citing State v. Jalette, 382 A.2d 526, 
531–32 (R.I. 1978)).  
 32.  Folwell v. Providence Journal Co., 37 A. 6, 8 (R.I. 1896) (emphasis 
added) (quoting 3 J. G. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 
1226 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1893)).  While Folwell’s proposition came in a 
libel case, the notion rings true for any specific instance of prior misconduct: 
there is an inherent difficulty in proving them.  Cf.  R.I. R. EVID. 405 advisory 
committee’s note (“[J]ust when a specific act has some bearing on the case is 
an everchanging concept.”).  While the method of proof for evidence of prior 
bad acts is not the subject of this article, the governing law is surely a close 
cousin of the question presented about the standard of admissibility for Rule 
404(b) evidence.  See id.  The issue of when evidence of prior misconduct is 
admissible is closely related to how that evidence is proved. See id. 
 33.  179 A. 147 (R.I. 1935).   
 34.  Id. at 149.   
 35.  Id. at 148.   
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funds to meet his living expenses and financial obligations.”36  The 
government put forth evidence of the defendant’s prior “immoral 
sexual conduct toward females who were under his protection in 
care,” to bolster the proof that the defendant had the requisite bad 
intent to make false representations.37  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court upheld the presentation of evidence to the jury 
because the conduct was inextricably “connected with . . . [his] 
scheme to deceive and defraud.”38  The court also recited its 
general rule “that in the trial of a criminal offense evidence of 
other and distinct criminal acts is generally prejudicial and 
inadmissible,” and exceptions to this rule should be “invoked with 
caution.”39  Given the ample proof presented and the special 
relevance to the charged offense, the defendant’s prior wrong was 
not protected by the rule of exclusion because it was offered “to 
establish guilty knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan, scheme, 
system, or the like.”40 
This formulation served as the basis for the Rhode Island’s 
treatment of evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts.  As the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court summarized in State v. Sepe: 
It is a generally accepted rule that evidence indicative of 
a bad character or a criminal disposition on the part of a 
defendant is inadmissible to prove the likelihood that he 
committed a particular offense.  These authorities 
nevertheless recognized certain exceptions to the general 
rule.  Although these exceptions cannot be stated with 
categorical precision, evidence of other conduct, even if 
criminal, is competent to prove the specific crime charged 
 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. at 149.   
 38.  Id.  The court explained how the evidence was relevant to whether 
the defendant was guilty of the charged offense:  
Any evidence which showed that, during the very period when he 
was making [representations that he had spiritual healing powers] 
and in the very house in which he was practicing what he claimed to 
be divine healing, he was also engaged in immoral sexual conduct 
toward females who were under his protection and care, was 
admissible as strongly tending to prove that, when he made these 
representations, he knew them to be false and that he was acting in 
bad faith. 
Id. 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id.  
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when it tends to establish (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) the 
absence of mistake, (4) a common scheme or plan 
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so 
related to each other that proof of one tends to establish 
the others, or (5) the identity of the person charged with 
the commission of the crime on trial.41 
Therefore, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court undertook an 
effort to codify its rules of evidence, Rhode Island caselaw reveals 
that the common-law rule regarding prior bad acts was considered 
a “general rule of exclusion.”42  
B. Codifying the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 
In 1987, the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence, in keeping with a nationwide movement 
on the part of states to codify uniform rules of evidence.43  Rhode 
Island’s Rule 404(b) now provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that the person acted in conformity therewith.  It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to 
prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and 
that the fear was reasonable.44 
Rule 404(b)’s advisory committee notes explain that “Rhode 
Island law provide[s] for certain exceptions to this general rule of 
exclusion.”45  As such, during “the trial of a criminal offense 
‘evidence of other and distinct criminal acts is generally 
prejudicial and inadmissible.’”46  Rhode Island courts have since 
 
 41.  410 A.2d 127, 130 (R.I. 1980) (citations omitted).   
 42.  State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 720 (R.I. 1985).   
 43.  Mia Ruscetta, The Tangled Web of Other Bad Acts, 49 R.I. B.J. 11, 11 
(June 2001).  The Rhode Island General Assembly subsequently adopted the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court’s proposed rules of evidence, and the rules took 
effect on October 1, 1987.  1987 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 381, § 1 (codified as 
amended at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-42 (1987)).  
 44.  R.I. R. EVID. 404(b).   
 45.  ERIC D. GREEN & ROBERT G. FLANDERS, RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE 
MANUAL § 404.02, at 96 (2005 ed.) (emphasis added).   
 46.  Id. (quoting State v. Ryan, 321 A.2d 92, 95 (R.I. 1974)).   
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supplemented Rule 404(b)’s permissible uses with two judicially 
crafted exceptions: the complete story and lewd disposition 
doctrines.47 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s adoption of the Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence did not mark a sea of change in the 
judiciary’s approach towards its evidentiary framework.  In fact, 
within Eric D. Green’s Analysis of Changes in Rhode Island Law 
of Evidence Under Draft Proposed Rules, any mention of an analog 
of Federal Rule 404(b) was noticeably absent.48  The permissible 
inference is that Rhode Island, in codifying its Rules of Evidence, 
did not alter the rule for when evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, 
and other bad acts is admissible.49  Thus, Rhode Island’s adoption 
of a set of evidentiary rules simply codified the existing caselaw 
surrounding evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts.  Rhode 
Island’s exclusionary approach to such evidence, coupled with the 
caselaw’s strong cautionary approach towards admitting such 
evidence, was still good law at the time of Rhode Island’s 
codification of its Rules of Evidence.  Still, Rhode Island—even 
after enacting its Rule 404(b), drafting advisory committee notes, 
and developing pre-codification caselaw on the subject—had yet to 
set a bright-line, substantive standard for the admissibility of 
evidence pertaining to a defendant’s prior bad acts. 
C. Rhode Island Adopts the Huddleston Approach 
Two recent cases reveal that the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
has attempted to suppress confusion surrounding admissibility of 
evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts.50  However, the court 
resolved this confusion in favor of an approach not supported in its 
precedent.  First, in State v. Gaspar, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court overturned a trial court’s decision to admit Rule 404(b) 
evidence by way of Rule 403.51  In Gaspar, the State of Rhode 
Island prosecuted the defendant for first-degree sexual assault.52  
 
 47.  Ruscetta, supra note 43, at 11.   
 48.  See Eric D. Green, Annotation, Analysis of Changes in Rhode Island 
Law of Evidence Under Draft Proposed Rules, R.I. CT. R. ANN. 990, 990 
(1985). 
 49.  See id.   
 50.  See State v. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145 (R.I. 2010); State v. Gaspar, 982 
A.2d 140 (R.I. 2009).   
 51.  Gaspar, 982 A.2d at 147.   
 52.  Id. at 145.  The defendant faced six counts of first-degree sexual 
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The facts revealed at trial were sexually explicit in nature.53  The 
defendant’s first trial on this matter ended with a jury deadlock, 
and resulted in a mistrial.54  His second trial resulted in his 
conviction on five of six counts of first-degree sexual assault.55  On 
appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the government’s 
presentation of testimony from the defendant’s former sexual 
partner, was inadmissible under Rule 404(b).56  However, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to address the defendant’s 
argument directly, and instead applied Rule 403, finding that the 
likelihood that the sexually graphic testimony would “confuse the 
jury and invite an emotional response” outweighed its probative 
value.57  The court declined to discuss whether the evidence had 
been properly admitted under Rule 404(b) because the nature of 
the evidence necessitated suppression under Rule 403.58  Notably, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, for the first time, cited with 
approval the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation in 
Huddleston, which set the stage for a more formal adoption of its 
reasoning.59 
One year later, in State v. Rodriguez, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court formally adopted the Huddleston approach to Rule 
404(b).60  The court recited the familiar procedure for considering 
the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence when challenged on 
 
assault—one for each sexual act performed on the victim on the night of the 
alleged encounter.  Id.    
 53.  See id. at 142–45. 
 54.  Id. at 145.  
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. at 145–46.  
 57.  Id. at 147, 149.   
 58.  Id. at 145.   
 59.  See id. at 148.  The court endorsed Huddleston and noted that R.I. R. 
EVID. 403 provides a procedural safeguard against the admission of 404(b) 
evidence: 
Rule 403 cuts across the rules of evidence and is always a 
consideration in a trial justice’s ruling on the admissibility of Rule 
404(b) evidence. . . . Similar approaches have been endorsed by the 
federal courts applying the substantially analogous Federal Rules of 
Evidence 403 and 404(b).   
Id.  See also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688 (1988) (noting 
that evidence properly offered under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) “is 
subject only to general strictures limiting admissibility such as Rules 402 and 
403”)).   
 60.  996 A.2d 145, 151–52 (R.I. 2010).   
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appeal.61  First, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts must be 
offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b).62  This procedural 
protection is installed within the rules of evidence to prevent the 
introduction of other-act evidence for the purpose of establishing 
someone’s propensity to act in kind.”63  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court then formally adopted the Huddleston approach: 
First, a trial justice may exclude evidence of a prior act 
under Rule 104(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 
if she concludes that the jury could not reasonably find by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the prior act 
occurred.  Second, a trial justice may exclude evidence 
under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence if 
she finds that its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice.  Lastly, 
a trial justice must, upon the request of counsel, issue a 
cautionary instruction to the jury reminding it not to 
consider the evidence for propensity purposes.64 
In doing so, the court implicitly concluded that these procedural 
protections were sufficient to guard “against admitting unfairly 
prejudicial prior bad acts evidence.”65 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on a strict reading of 
Rule 404(b) to adopt the Huddleston approach to evidence of prior 
bad acts.66  After parsing the language of Rhode Island Rule of 
Evidence 404(b), the court determined that the rule’s “exceptions” 
indicated that the rule is one of inclusion, not exclusion.  Although 
the court had previously described the rule’s opening sentence—
that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith”67—serves as its “‘general 
 
 61.  See id.   
 62.  See id. at 150–52.   
 63.  See id.; R.I. R. EVID. 404(b).  Just as the United States Supreme 
Court held in Huddleston, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the 
proper purpose requirement stands as the first guard against inappropriate 
admission of prior misconduct evidence.  See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691 
(1988); Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 151.   
 64.  Id. at 151–52 (citations omitted) (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689–
91).   
 65.  See id. at 151.   
 66.  See id. at 150–51.   
 67.  Id. at 150 & n.7 (quoting R.I. R. EVID. 404(b)).   
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exclusionary’”68 provision,  Rule 404(b)’s second sentence—that 
“such evidence may be ‘admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake, or accident. . .’”69—plainly conveys 
an inclusionary approach to such evidence.70  The court reasoned 
that the rule is one of exclusion only when such evidence is offered 
for propensity purposes, but when evidence is offered for a 
permitted purpose—i.e., any purpose other than “to prove that the 
accused has a criminal disposition and, therefore, is more likely to 
have committed the crime for which he stands accused”—the rule 
morphs into one of inclusion.71  In other words, “the second 
sentence in Rule 404(b) is . . . a simple reiteration of the broad 
admissibility principles that undergird our rules of evidence.”72 
While the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not frame it as 
such, the inclusionary approach to Rule 404(b)’s second sentence 
marks a change in Rhode Island’s evidentiary framework.  As 
Justice Robinson pointed out in his concurrence, “it is inaccurate 
to state that our rules of evidence are undergirded by ‘broad 
admissibility principles.’”73  Justice Robinson disagreed with the 
court’s “implication that this Court should interpret Rule 404(b) as 
a rule of inclusion.”74  In fact, not only did Justice Robinson not 
find that the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence were based upon the 
principles of “broad admissibility,” he also did not “locate an 
opinion from [the court] which characterizes the rule in that 
manner.”75  Rather, he explained, “several opinions of [the court] 
clearly indicate that Rule 404(b) should be viewed as a rule of 
exclusion.”76  As Justice Robinson made clear, Rodriguez turned 
Rhode Island’s traditionally exclusionary approach to Rule 404(b) 
on its head.77 
 
 68.  Id. (quoting State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 148 (R.I. 2009)).  
 69.  Id. (quoting R.I. R. EVID. 404(b)).   
 70.  Id. at 150–51.   
 71.  See id.  
 72.  Id. at 151.   
 73.  Id. at 154 (Robinson, J. concurring) (quoting majority opinion). 
 74.  Id.    
 75.  Id.   
 76.  Id. (collecting cases). 
 77.  See id. at 154–56.  Justice Robinson further explained that the court 
has historically treated evidence of prior wrongs as “presumptively 
inadmissible.”  Id. (citing State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 316 (R.I. 1997).   
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III. THE TROUBLE WITH HUDDLESTON AND RODRIGUEZ 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s newly adopted 
inclusionary approach to Rule 404(b)—even when applied to only 
a single sentence of the rule—directly conflicts with the rule’s 
underlying purposes.78  It has been argued that three policies 
justify Rhode Island’s Rule 404(b): (1) “to prevent jurors from 
unjustly convicting a defendant based on their presumptive belief 
that the accused is a bad person”; (2) “to prevent jurors from 
convicting a defendant based on their belief that the prior bad acts 
indicate an ongoing propensity in the accused to commit the 
charged crime”; and, (3) because “admit[ting] prior uncharged 
misconduct evidence may impose an unreasonable burden on the 
defendant.”79  However, one scholar raised a loftier goal that Rule 
404(b) aims to serve.80  Instead of focusing on the propensity 
inference, to which a jury may assign improper weight, Professor 
Paul Milich argues that the better justification for Rule 404(b) is 
to preserve the presumption of innocence for all defendants who 
stand accused of a crime.81  The crux of this argument is that Rule 
404(b) ensures that every defendant—the sinner and the saint 
alike—is equally entitled to the same presumption of innocence.82  
This is indeed the most significant promise underpinning Rule 
404(b): regardless of what prior acts trail a defendant as he enters 
the courthouse, he approaches the jury with a presumption of 
innocence.83 
Framing Rule 404(b) as an evidentiary rule that guarantees 
the presumption of innocence challenges Rodriguez’s adoption of 
Huddleston.  When considering the admission of Rule 404(b) 
evidence in light of undue prejudice alone, the procedural 
safeguards may seem adequate.84  For example, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court vigorously applied Rule 403’s balancing test to 
 
 78.  See Marsden, supra note 33, at 340–42. 
 79.  Id. at 341–42.  
 80.  See Milich, supra note 4, at 791–97.   
 81.  See id.  
 82.  See id. at 795.   
 83.  See id. at 795–96.  Rule 404(b) is not so much concerned with a jury’s 
overvaluation of prior bad acts as it is with requiring a jury “to give the 
benefit of the doubt and then some to a fellow citizen who stands in jeopardy 
of tasting the state’s awesome power to take away that citizen’s liberty.”  Id.  
 84.  See State v. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145, 151–52 (R.I. 2010).   
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suppress evidence in Gaspar.85  However, the court’s 
reconstruction of Rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion conflicts with 
the more persuasive rationale underlying the rule—the 
presumption of innocence.86  When a Rhode Island trial court 
applies Rodriguez’s inclusionary approach to Rule 404(b), it 
considers the evidence with an eye towards “broad admissibility 
principles.”87  This umbrella of broad admissibility allows for 
evidence, previously scrutinized and disfavored in Rhode Island, 
to begin its “lubricated” path towards admission.88 
The first problem with Huddleston lies within its lack of 
substantive protections at the outset of the Rule 404(b) inquiry.  
In Huddleston, the Court denied the defendant’s argument that 
the trial court should make a preliminary finding as to whether 
the government proved the occurrence of the prior bad act before 
determining whether the government had articulated a permitted 
purpose for the evidence under Rule 404(b).89  The Court’s 
decision to deny a preliminary finding under Rule 104(a), and 
instead couching that finding under Rule 104(b), allows the flow of 
Rule 404(b) evidence into trial courts, thus stripping away Rule 
404(b)’s protection.  Rather than requiring a preliminary finding 
of admissibility prior to the Rule 404(b) proper purpose 
determination, the Court placed the trial court’s decision too far 
along the procedural framework of the rules of evidence.  Each of 
these rules build procedural, or mechanical, protections against 
admitting potentially prejudicial evidence; however, substantive 
protection, at the outset of the introduction of prior bad acts 
evidence, is warranted to adhere to Rule 404(b)’s purposes.   
Rhode Island’s adoption of this approach is equally 
 
 85.  State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 147–48 (R.I. 2009).   
 86.  See Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 155 (Robinson, J., concurring); see also 
Milich, supra note 4, at 794–96.  
 87.  See Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 151 (majority opinion).   
 88.  See Milich, supra note 4, at 780.   
 89.  Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687–88 (1988).  The 
defendant in Huddleston argued for the same type of threshold inquiry put 
forth in this Article: that “[a]s a prerequisite to admitting misconduct 
evidence under 404(b), the government must prove the misconduct by clear 
and convincing evidence.” Brief for Petitioner, Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681 
(1988) (No. 87-6) at *31.  While the defendant in Huddleston offered three 
other solutions, the clear and convincing requirement is most persuasive 
here.  See id. at *30–31.   
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inadequate.90  First, the stage at which a trial court determines 
whether the government has proven the occurrence of the crime, 
wrong, or other bad act by a preponderance of the evidence 
happens after the trial court has begun the move towards 
admissibility.91  The trial court undertakes this analysis after 
finding that the evidence has been offered for a permitted purpose, 
and after it has determined that the evidence is relevant under 
Rule 402.92  Again, this is all beneath the umbrella of “broad 
admissibility principles,” which significantly alters the traditional 
approach to Rule 404(b) evidence.93  Under this umbrella, the trial 
court may be unable to treat the evidence with as much caution or 
subject it to as careful a weighing process as once before.94  Thus, 
all that is left for the trial court to substantively determine is 
whether Rule 104(b)’s conditional relevance requirement has been 
met.95  In other words, the occurrence of the prior bad act—i.e., 
the fact underlying the conditional relevance inquiry—is subjected 
to a mere preponderance of the evidence standard.96  The 
relevance of the evidence relies only upon the determination that 
a jury could reasonably find that it is more likely than not that the 
defendant committed the prior crime, wrong, or other act.97  This 
places evidence that is inherently and unfairly prejudicial, upon 
the scales of justice for a fifty-fifty balancing test. 
The preponderance standard for admissibility is too low at 
this stage of the trial court’s Huddleston inquiry.  The approach 
lends itself to far too much discretion at the trial court level.98  
Furthermore, the inquiry essentially becomes subjective:  The 
 
 90.  See Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 151–52 (“[A] trial justice may exclude 
evidence of a prior act under Rule 104(b) . . . if she concludes that the jury 
could not reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the act 
occurred.”) (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690). 
 91.  See id.   
 92.  See id.  
 93.  See id. at 153–54 (Robinson, J., concurring).   
 94.  Id. at 154 (regarding “evidence of prior wrongs [as] presumptively 
inadmissible”).   
 95.  See id. at 151–52 (majority opinion) (citing Huddleston v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988)).   
 96.  See id. 
 97.  See id. 
 98.  See Milich, supra note 4, at 790 (“[T]he character rule . . . has been 
getting clobbered in our courts.  This has been easy to accomplish where the 
rule poorly constrains and so much is left to the barely controlled discretion of 
the trial judge.”). 
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trial court considers the purported similar act in light of all of 
evidence presented, and determines whether, in the eyes of a 
reasonable jury, there is enough evidence to tip the scale towards 
admissibility.99  Now, in light of the umbrella “inclusion” 
approach, the hurdle over which the evidence must climb has 
already been lowered substantially.100  To add to this, the mere 
preponderance of proof standard further greases the wheels of the 
evidentiary inquiry towards admissibility.  This increases the 
chance for unpredictable case-by-case determinations dependent 
upon the trial court judge’s sole discretion as to whether there is 
just enough evidence to tip the scale.101  Especially in close cases, 
such a fifty-fifty inquiry seems too light when considering the 
drastic effect such evidence may have on a defendant’s 
presumption of innocence in the minds of jurors.  Leaving the 
introduction of evidence that is widely considered inflammatory 
and infectious up to a coin flip is not the type of protection 
envisioned by Rule 404(b).  The Rodriguez approach in Rhode 
Island has couched any substantive protection of Rule 404(b)’s 
promise too far along the route of admissibility.  The timing of this 
inquiry is too late, and the standard for admissibility is too low. 
Second, the procedural safeguards within the Rhode Island 
Rules of Evidence should serve more as a backstop for substantive 
protection from the admission of crimes, wrongs, and other bad 
acts rather than as the frontline protection.  The procedural dams 
endorsed in Rodriguez—Rule 104(b)’s conditional relevance 
requirement, Rule 403’s balancing test, and a Rule 105 limiting 
instruction—should act as fallback protections against which a 
trial court examines the introduction of Rule 404(b) evidence.102  
This is consistent with the original intent and approach behind 
Rule 404(b): a general approach of exclusion.103  While Rule 403’s 
 
 99.  See Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 151–52 (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 
690). 
 100.  See id. at 154 (Robinson, J., concurring). 
 101.  See Lisa Marshall, Note, The Character of Discrimination Law: The 
Incompatibility of Rule 404 and Employment Discrimination Suits, 114 YALE 
L.J. 1063, 1092 (2005) (“[T]he unarticulated exception to the propensity ban 
leaves courts confused over its outer boundaries . . . .”); see also Milich, supra 
note 4, at 790. 
 102.  See id.  
 103.  See GREEN & FLANDERS, supra note 48, § 404.02 (characterizing Rule 
404(b) as a “general rule of exclusion”).  But see State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 
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balancing test is perhaps the best justification for the Rodriguez 
approach to Rule 404(b),104 it still proves insufficient when the 
defendant’s presumption of innocence is at stake.  As one 
commenter explained: 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Huddleston will 
effectually ease the burden for the proponent of other-acts 
evidence.  The burden is on the opponent of the evidence 
to convince the court that the danger of admitting the 
evidence “substantially outweighs” its probative value.  
This is an onerous burden for the opponent of the 
evidence.  The opponent’s burden of overcoming Rule 403, 
the inclusionary approach to Rule 404(b), and Rule 
104(b)’s liberal standard for proving that the defendant 
committed the extrinsic act will combine to ease the task 
of getting other-acts evidence admitted at trial.105 
This is yet another concern with the inclusionary approach to 
Rule 404(b)—it infects the way each of the procedural protections 
are purported to work.106  This becomes all the more antithetical 
to Rule 404(b)’s promise to protect the presumption of innocence 
when one considers how a defendant can reasonably defend that 
presumption when the jury hears evidence of his or her other 
crimes, wrongs, and bad acts.  What sort of case can the defendant 
put on to push back against Rule 403’s weighing test, which is 
“substantially” tilted against him or her?107  Furthermore, in 
 
720 (R.I. 1985) (placing this “general rule of exclusion” in the context of a 
non-exhaustive list of exceptions).   
 104.  See GREEN & FLANDERS, supra note 48, § 403.02 (“In Rhode Island, 
the trial judge has the traditional discretion to exclude logically relevant 
evidence that is unfairly prejudicial.”). 
 105.  Jane C. Hofmeyer, Case Note, A Relaxed Standard of Proof for Rule 
404(b) Evidence: United States v. Huddleston, 6 COOLEY L. REV. 79, 91 (1989) 
(citations omitted).  While Hofmeyer agrees with the Court’s approach in 
Huddleston, her outline of the way Rule 403 works in conjunction with the 
admission of 404(b) evidence is on point here. 
 106.  See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687–91 (1988).  The 
other admissibility considerations—relevance under Rule 402, sufficient 
factual basis under Rule 104(b), and avoidance of unfair prejudice under Rule 
403— are colored by the trial court’s proneness to admissibility.  See id.  The 
same is true with the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s holding in State v. 
Rodriguez.  996 A.2d at 151–52.   
 107.  See CIPES ET AL., supra note 4, § 26A.01[3].  Furthermore, this may 
raise constitutional questions as to the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to 
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cases where the prior bad act is not so egregious, Rule 403 is 
unlikely to bar the evidence.108  For example, the introduction of a 
defendant’s prior nonviolent drug offense would not likely 
substantially outweigh the probative value of that evidence.109  
Thus, Rule 403 proves inadequate to keep these types of crimes 
from sullying a defendant’s presumption of innocence.  Moreover, 
courts should not even engage in these mini-trials centered on the 
underlying fact on which conditional relevance hinges.110  
The final procedural protection endorsed in Rodriguez is a 
Rule 105 limiting instruction.111  There has been much debate as 
to whether such limiting instructions, particularly those directed 
towards Rule 404(b) evidence, are all that effective.112  Then, 
there is the ultimate decision of whether a trial court judge will 
issue a limiting instruction at all.113  Again, there is still a real 
concern that the adoption of an inclusionary approach to Rule 
404(b) has damaged each these procedural protections along the 
route towards admissibility. 
Rodriguez couches protection too far along the road to 
admissibility, which, when coupled with the potential for 
unpredictable, case-by-case determinations as to whether the 
government has carried its burden of proof, signals that the 
procedural safeguards, without more, are inadequate.  These 
 
avoid self-incrimination as well as his Sixth Amendment right to confront his 
accused.  See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.   
 108.  See R.I. R. EVID. 403; see also State v. Pratt, 641 A.2d 732, 742 (R.I. 
1994). 
 109.  See R.I. R. EVID. 403.   
 110.   Time saved should not outweigh the potential for time served; 
administrative convenience in avoiding mini-trials over character evidence 
ought to tilt towards the presumption of innocence.   
 111.  Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 152. 
 112.  See Nicole M. Priolo, Topical Survey, Can A Curative Instruction 
Effectively Remedy Impermissible References to A Defendant’s Past Criminal 
Behavior?—State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206 (R.I. 1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 583, 588 (1997) (explaining that the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s 
overturning a conviction based on the lack of effectiveness of the trial court’s 
limiting instruction in the face of admission of character evidence “weakens 
the strength of the curative instruction”); see also David Alan Sklansky, 
Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. 407, 408–09 
(2013). 
 113.  In Rhode Island, this question is answered depending on the nature 
of the crime charged.  See, e.g., Ruscetta, supra note 43, at 49–50 (explaining 
the different treatment in Rhode Island of sexual offenses and non-sexual 
offenses with respect to Rule 105 instructions).   
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procedural safeguards are especially inadequate in light of Rule 
404(b)’s promise that each defendant is entitled to a presumption 
of innocence.  Therefore, substantive protection installed at the 
outset of the introduction of Rule 404(b) evidence is required. 
IV. THE SOLUTION: SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION 
The allure to use other acts evidence lies in its ability to fill in 
gaps where the prosecution would otherwise need traditional 
evidence.114  Prior bad acts evidence plants the bad seed of the 
defendant’s character into the mind of the jury, allowing the jury 
to fertilize the prosecution’s theory of the case by filling in small 
holes along the way.  But the entire point behind Rule 404(b) is to 
act as a filter, to protect the case from that kind of improper 
exposure.115  In this way, procedural protection has proven 
inadequate.116  It is as if the protection of the rules evaporates 
once evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other bad acts comes into play.  
The defendant faces extensive litigation over each procedural 
dam, while simultaneously unable to rely on any realistic 
substantive protection.  Counsel for the defendant is also faced 
with a Hobson’s choice as the trial proceeds: call attention to the 
evidence in closing argument, or let it linger hoping that the seed 
has not yet planted in the mind of the jury.  Without a substantive 
stopgap, the defendant’s presumption of innocence is left entirely 
to a balancing act: does the evidence tend to show that the 
defendant engaged in prior misconduct by a preponderance of the 
evidence?117 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court should adopt a more 
substantive protection against the inherent threat to just verdicts 
posed by evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts.  The court 
can do so by making the standard of admissibility a threshold 
issue for Rule 404(b) evidence.118  Rather than continue to follow 
the Huddleston approach and couch a preponderance of the 
evidence showing within Rule 104(b), the court can make 
 
 114.  See Milich, supra note 4, at 782–84.   
 115.  See State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1053 (R.I. 2000). 
 116.  See supra Part III.  
 117.  See State v. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145, 151–52 (R.I. 2010).   
 118.  See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at *30–31, Huddleston v. United States, 
485 U.S. 681 (No. 87-6) (listing various approaches to admissibility of Rule 
404(b) evidence).   
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admissibility a threshold issue and require a trial justice to make 
an initial factual finding under Rule 104(a).119  Furthermore, the 
court should raise the standard to require a finding of clear and 
convincing proof of the defendant’s crime, wrong, or other bad 
act.120  Substantive protection, by way of a clear and convincing 
standard of admissibility at the outset of the government’s 
introduction of 404(b) evidence, coupled with the Rodriguez’s 
procedural protections, best serves the promises at the heart of 
Rule 404(b).121 
This approach best affirms the promise that each defendant 
in a criminal case, who “starts his life afresh when he stands 
before a jury, a prisoner at the bar,” is indeed presumed 
innocent.122  As Justice Robinson articulated in Rodriguez, Rhode 
Island has a long-standing, well-established approach to regard 
Rule 404(b) as a general rule of exclusion.123  In fact, Justice 
Robinson also argued to make the Rule 404(b) a threshold inquiry, 
by first installing a presumption against admissibility and second 
placing the burden of admissibility onto the evidence’s 
proponent.124  This is precisely in keeping with the need for 
substantive protection before the procedural mechanism of 
Rodriguez and Huddleston engage and the wheels towards 
admissibility are greased. 
Requiring clear and convincing proof of evidence of a 
defendant’s crime, wrong, or other bad act would also alleviate the 
concerns with case-by-case determinations as to which evidence 
will come in and which will not.125  As this standard of 
 
 119.  See id. 
 120.  See id.  Before Huddleston, “[t]his test [was] followed by the Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits.”  Id. at *30. 
 121.  Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 151–52.   
 122.  See People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).   
 123.  See Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 154 (Robinson, J., concurring) (“I have yet 
to locate an opinion from this Court which characterizes the rule [as a rule of 
inclusion]—whereas several opinions of this Court clearly indicate that Rule 
404(b) should be viewed as a rule of exclusion.”).   
 124.  Id. at 150–52 (majority opinion) (stating that the court should 
“expressly recognize that there is (1) a rebuttable presumption against the 
admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence and (2) a principle that the proponent of 
Rule 404(b) evidence bears the burden of establishing its admissibility.”) 
(footnote omitted).   
 125.  See id. at 150–52.  By adopting a broad inclusionary approach to the 
latter sentence of Rhode Island’s Rule 404(b), the Rhode Island Supreme 
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admissibility is stricter than that of a showing by a preponderance 
of the evidence, the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s application of 
its standard of review for reversible error is reduced.  This bright-
line rule would help eliminate unpredictable trial court rulings on 
admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence, especially in close cases.  A 
bright-line, upfront rule for admissibility would also avoid 
potential missteps along the path of various interlocking 
procedural safeguards in the rules of evidence. 
Rather than focus on the intangible concern of a jury’s undue 
prejudice and overemphasis on evidence of crimes, wrongs, and 
other acts, the Rhode Island Supreme Court can place a 
substantive roadblock on the frontline of such evidence’s 
admissibility.  In keeping with the underlying promise and 
purposes of Rule 404(b), Rhode Island’s courts should serve as 
gatekeepers against admission of evidence of crimes, wrongs, and 
other acts.  Only when evidence of a defendant’s crimes, wrongs, 
and other acts are proven by clear and convincing evidence and 
admitted for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) should it gain 
admission to the sanctum of the jury’s deliberations.  Together, 
substantive and procedural protections equally respect 
fundamental fairness and the presumption of innocence for each 
defendant who approaches the jury, “a prisoner at the bar.”126 
The greatest power of Rule 404(b) evidence lies within its 
ability to sprinkle seeds of doubt against the defendant’s 
presumed innocence.  Courts can prevent juror-mind-wandering 
and gap-filling as to whether the defendant has a guilty past, and 
focus them on whether the defendant is guilty based on the facts 
presently before the jury.  This is best achieved with a substantive 
measure of protection—a bright-line, predictable standard of 
admissibility for evidence of a defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts.   
CONCLUSION 
Re-invigorated by the study of mass incarceration, legal 
scholars, jurists, prosecutors, defense counsel, and others alike 
 
Court forgoes the benefits that a clear and convincing standard offers when 
determining admissibility of evidence and omits necessary protections to the 
defendant.  See id. 
 126.  See People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).   
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have begun to reconsider the ways in which the criminal justice 
system ought to work.  In light of this conversation about the 
merits of crime and punishment, the time is now due to reaffirm 
substantive protection against character evidence.  As explained 
above, the procedural filters the Court endorsed in Huddleston, 
and which Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted in Rodriguez, are 
insufficient.  Substantive protection in the form of clear and 
convincing evidence is necessary.  Evidence of a defendant’s 
crimes, wrongs, and other acts measured against a clear and 
convincing standard of admissibility best adheres to the 
exclusionary purpose to Rule 404(b).  The Rhode Island Supreme 
Court has the power to right this wrong. 
This is not a question of a wayward, activist judicial 
imposition onto the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.  Rather, it is 
a question of fundamental fairness and presumption of innocence, 
read together with the inherent purpose of the rule: to bar 
evidence of an individual’s characteristic to prove he acted in 
conformity therewith at the time of the charged offense. Rule 
404(b) ought to be treated as an exclusionary rule because it was 
designed as one.  Reading the rule as one of exclusion promotes 
fundamental fairness, giving an accused individual and his 
counsel a direct opportunity to challenge evidence before the 
inevitable flow of prior misconduct evidence flows forthwith.  
Rather than reciting the protection of procedural dams, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court can provide substantive protection to 
charged individuals facing admission of evidence of crimes, 
wrongs, and other acts.  Ensuring substantive protection by 
adopting a standard of evidence that requires clear and convincing 
proof of an individual’s prior bad acts would help move the 
criminal justice system towards a more perfect system—one that 
convicts in the right way for the right reasons. 
Raising an evidentiary standard of admissibility may be a 
small solution, but it strives to restore two bedrock values of the 
criminal justice system: fundamental fairness and the 
presumption of innocence.   The way to do this is to provide more 
protection, not less.  In the absence of legislative action, the court 
can re-sculpt Rule 404(b) to layer substantive protection on top of 
the procedural blocks already in place.  It is time to reconsider 
Huddleston/Rodriguez and restore the character evidence rule in 
Rhode Island.    
